A Federal Perspective: The Second Amendment as a Fundamental Aspect of Liberty by Parilla, Mary Elizabeth
Florida A & M University Law Review
Volume 4
Number 1 Fall 2008/Spring 2009 Article 6
Fall 2009
A Federal Perspective: The Second Amendment as
a Fundamental Aspect of Liberty
Mary Elizabeth Parilla
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.law.famu.edu/famulawreview
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida A & M
University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law. For more information, please contact
linda.barrette@famu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mary E. Parilla, A Federal Perspective: The Second Amendment as a Fundamental Aspect of Liberty, 4 Fla. A&M U. L. Rev. (2009).
Available at: http://commons.law.famu.edu/famulawreview/vol4/iss1/6
A FEDERAL PERSPECTIVE: THE SECOND




A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed. '
In recent years, the words of the Second Amendment have po-
larized American society. Scholars, legislators, and members of the
judiciary cannot seem to reach a consensus as to the true meaning of
the Second Amendment. Yet while all of this discourse exists, most
American law schools choose to exclude study of the Second Amend-
ment in Constitutional Law courses. These educational institutions
are missing a golden opportunity to bring clarity, meaning, and under-
standing to the Second Amendment and the inconsistent and
misguided interpretations that many members of society harbor con-
cerning it. It makes one wonder whether America's law schools are
deliberately foregoing study and classroom debate aimed at interpret-
ing and understanding the Second Amendment. If future members of
the Bar remain ignorant of the history and tradition surrounding the
Second Amendment, they will not discover the abundance of scholarly
writings which reveal the truth, which is that these writings support
the individual rights model of the Second Amendment.2
* Mary Elizabeth Parilla graduated in September 2008 and is now a law clerk at
Holcombe Bomar, PA in Spartanburg, South Carolina. Special thanks to Professor Philip J.
Prygoski, Constitutional Law Professor at Thomas M. Cooley School of Law for inspiring
her and believing in her abilities to both write and seek publication of this paper. She would
also like to thank her family for their support throughout her law school endeavors, and the
NRA Civil Rights Defense Fund for recognizing her work.
1. 1 U.S. CONST. amend. II
2. Mike Cox, Second Amendment Showdown (2007), available at http://www.opinion
journal.com/editorial/feature.tml?id=110010898 (last visited Apr. 16, 2009). There are
generally three interpretations of the Second Amendment: The individual rights model; the
collective rights model, and the quasi-collective rights model. The individual rights model
supports the position that the Second Amendment bestows upon the people the right to hear
arms. The collective rights model advances the theory that only a government organized
militia has the right to bear arms. The quasi-collective rights model advances the theory
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Clearly, advancement of this theory would deal a striking blow
to gun control advocates who have been particularly successful in ad-
vancing their anti-individual rights interpretation of the Second
Amendment. Gun control proponents have found favorable platforms
from which to disseminate gun-control rhetoric to captive audiences in
both classrooms and in living rooms across the country. Liberal mem-
bers of the media regularly advance an anti-Second Amendment
agenda. 3 Moreover, the shift in Congressional power following the
2006 elections and the recent tragedy at Virginia Tech University
make upholding the individual rights interpretation of the Second
Amendment an even more pressing concern than it has been in recent
years.
4
In his 1989 Yale Law Journal article entitled, The Embarrass-
ing Second Amendment, Sanford Levinson advances this very theory.
To put it mildly, the Second Amendment is not at the forefront of
constitutional discussion, at least as registered in what the acad-
emy regards as the venues for such discussion-law reviews,
casebooks, and other scholarly legal publications .... '[Tihe second
amendment is not taken seriously by most scholars.'
5
Legal scholars, however, would be hard-pressed to argue that
the Second Amendment is not an essential tool for an attorney who
plans to practice in just about any aspect of the law. In the criminal
law context, it is undeniable that oftentimes people charged with non-
gun related crimes find themselves in the unenviable position of hav-
that only the National Guard was intended to bear arms, despite the National Guard not
being in the existence at the time the Second Amendment was ratified.
3. See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637,
641 (1989) (quoting: "I cannot help but suspect that the best explanation for the absence of
the Second Amendment from the legal consciousness of the elite bar, including that
component found in the legal academy, is derived from a mixture of sheer opposition to the
idea of private ownership of guns and the perhaps subconscious fear that altogether
plausible, perhaps even 'winning', interpretations of the Second Amendment would present
real hurdles to those of us supporting prohibitory regulation. Thus the title of this essay-The
Embarrassing Second Amendment-for I want to suggest that the Amendment may be
profoundly embarrassing to many who both support such regulation and view themselves as
committed to zealous adherence to the Bill of Rights, such as most members of the ACLU");
See also Bernard Goldberg, Bias: A CBS Insider Exposes How the Media Distort the News,
126 (Regenery Publishing 2002 ) (78% of journalists for tougher gun control).
4. Wayne LaPierre, Standing Guard, America's Freedom First, (April 2004) NRA
OFFICIAL JOURNAL, www.nrapublications.orgISH/index.asp.html (last visited April 8, 2008)
Oct. 2006 (Senators Chuck Schumer (D-NY), Hillary Clinton (D-NY), Ted Kennedy (D-MA),
Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ), supporting house-to-house searches
and firearms confiscation in New Orleans during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina).
5. Levison, supra note 3, at 639-40.
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ing illegal firearms charges raised concurrently. 6 An attorney
practicing in domestic relations or family law may encounter a client
alleging domestic abuse. 7 If the alleged abuser is also an alleged fire-
arms owner, regardless of whether such allegation is later discovered
to be founded, the accused will stand by and watch his Second Amend-
ment rights become eviscerated right before his eyes.8
Second Amendment issues are being raised in just about every
legal practice area including: property law9 ; probate law'0 ; and tort
law". A corporate attorney may encounter a client engaged in the fire-
arms business who is faced with excessive taxation or burdensome
licensing schemes. These schemes are deliberate ploys designed to do
nothing other than make the firearms business cost prohibitive. The
polarizing effects of the debate over the Second Amendment are seen in
virtually all aspects of American culture today. Unfortunately, many
members of the unwitting public buy into gun control rhetoric without
performing any independent investigation into the accuracy of media
reports.
The anti-gun members of Congress are known for regularly pro-
posing new federal gun control legislation. 12 Some of these bills have
6. See Matter of Rose, 1994 WL 692794 at *199 (Cal. Bar Ct. 1994) (paraplegic
attorney cited for traffic violation is criminally charged and disbarred for possessing
handgun, despite having had a concealed weapons permit for over 20 years, being
threatened by a drug addict acquaintance, and possessing a recently expired concealed
weapons permit).
7. See generally United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 602 (N.D. Tex. 1999),
rev'd in part, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
8. See Steven G. Bradbury et al., Whether the Second Amendment Secures an
Individual Right, 2004 WL 2930974, at *105-06 (2004) (citing United States v. Emerson,
270 F.3d 203, 261 (5th Cir. 2001) (Upholding restriction on firearm ownership for
individuals under restraining order, but finding that the second Amendment is a protected
individual right).
9. JEssE DUKMINIER ET. AL., PROPERTY (6th Ed., Aspen Publisher 2006); citing
Timothy Egan, The Serene Fortress: Many Seek Security in Private Communities, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 3, 1995, §1, at 1., Noting that the homeowner's association in the Bear Creek
community outside of Seattle, Washington, subjected residents to restrictive covenants in
exchange for the privilege of residing in their gated, residential community. One of the
community's covenants imposed a gun control restriction on all residents.
10. See Rousseau v. Rousseau, 910 So.2d 1214, 1218 (Miss. 2005) (decedent bequeaths
firearms to heirs); Craig v. Perry, 565 So.2d 171 (Ala. 1990); Stewart v. Douglas, 29 S.W.2d
637 (Ky. 1930); In re Van Valkenburgh's Will, 113 N.Y.S. 1108, 1109 (1908).
11. See generally Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (relative of
decedent files wrongful death suit against gun manufacturer); Chumney v. United States
Repeating Arms Co., Inc., 196 F.R.D. 419 (M.D. Ala. 2000).
12. See The Assault Weapons Ban and Law Enforcement Protection Act of 2007, H.R.
1022, 110th Cong. (2007) (Proposes to ban over 65 specifically listed firearms, and
additional firearms components, including, but not limited to stocks and pistol grips).
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actually been passed into law. 13 Congress often relies on the Com-
merce Clause as the derivative power source for such legislation.
However, several of these laws have later been found unconstitutional
abuses of congressional power. 14 Congress has also attempted to sub-
vert the Constitution and flex its muscle by commandeering state
governments. For example, the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act attempted to force states to fund and carry out federal legislation
that would have required state and local police departments to perform
background checks on prospective gun purchasers. 15 This scheme was
later found to be an. unconstitutional abuse of power in violation of the
Tenth Amendment. 16 However, not surprisingly, the gun control pro-
ponents in Congress argue that any judicial review of gun control
legislation should only be subjected to rational basis scrutiny, the low-
est threshold of scrutiny the court applies when evaluating the law.
Why is the Second Amendment not worthy of academic study in
our nation's law schools? One possibility is that because of the dispro-
portionate number of liberals in academia, who publicly advocate gun
control, do not wish to arm their students with the knowledge neces-
sary to fully understand the history and tradition of the Second
Amendment.' 7 Uneducated law students will shy away from challeng-
ing the constitutionality of gun control in this country simply because
they do not fully understand the Second Amendment. This seemingly
could result in the evisceration of the individual right to keep and bear
arms guaranteed by the Second Amendment, but it also could result in
law students failing to raise proper Second Amendment claims on be-
half of their future clients.
This paper advances the theory that the Second Amendment is
a fundamental aspect of Liberty under the Fifth Amendment and as
13. See Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
14. See id.; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Wherein the Supreme
Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 as an unconstitutional exercise of
Congress's commerce power); Parker v. Dist. of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 401 (2007).
15. Printz, 521 U.S. at 903 (requiring the state police officers to perform background
checks on prospective gun buyers in order to comply with the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act) (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding that Congress violated the Tenth
Amendment's separation of powers requirement when it compelled state actors to
implement the Brady Act).
16. Id.
17. See Debating Party Parity in Faculty Population, DUKE MAGAZINE, May-June 2004,
at 22, stating "[an overwhelming number of faculty members are Democrats" and there is a
"relative scarcity of Republicans in academia."; quoting political scientist Michael Munger,
"statistics showing a large preponderance of Democrats among faculty in certain Duke
departments could not be explained without considering the possibility of bias, even if
inadvertent." Congressional votes regarding gun control and the Second Amendment are
often distinguished by political party affiliation.
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such, has been incorporated to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. This conclusion was reached after performing a thorough
examination of specific writings contained in The Federalist Papers,
the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the writings of several
respected Constitutional scholars. Some of the frequently cited court
cases were examined to address the issue of whether a citizen pos-
sesses an "individual right" to keep and bear arms. Moreover, the
decision recently released by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
in Parker v. District of Columbia. Parker is being called "the most im-
portant Second Amendment case in 70 years" and definitively reaches
the conclusion that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual
right. Finally, the opinion issued by the U.S. Attorney General John
Ashcroft, which proffers additional support for the individual rights
model of the Second Amendment.18
History and the tradition of gun ownership in America is used
to bolster support for the Second Amendment as a fundamental aspect
of Liberty under both the Fifth Amendment's Liberty and Due Process
provisions. This analytical undertaking was necessary to conclude
that the Second Amendment's right to keep and bear arms is a funda-
mental right. The plain language of the text of the Second Amendment
is used to support this theory. The language used in the Second
Amendment was compared to several other Constitutional Amend-
ments which grant individual rights to the people.
II. THE SECOND AMENDMENT AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT AND A
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ASPECT OF LIBERTY
The structure of the United States government is based on a
tripartite system. Each of the three branches of government exists to
serve a different function. The government of the United States was
structured in this manner because our founders deemed it necessary to
incorporate checks and balances into the governmental system to pre-
vent any one branch from becoming too powerful. The first branch of
government, the legislative, is tasked with making our laws. It is the
job of the second branch of government, the executive, to enforce laws
that are enacted by the legislative branch. Finally, the third branch of
our government, the judiciary, is entrusted with the task of interpret-
ing the laws as enacted by the legislature. The judiciary's function is
solely to interpret the law. However, a study of the Court's opinions
reveals that at times, the Court has shown a willingness to "legislate
18. Id.
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from the bench." 19 This type of judicial activism is unequivocally pro-
hibited by the Constitution.
20
Neither the legislative nor the judicial branches of our govern-
ment have been friends of the Second Amendment in recent history.
Since 1934, the legislature has enacted numerous laws aimed at
abridging the individual right to keep and bear arms. 21 Notably, until
District of Columbia v. Heller,22 the Supreme Court had addressed only
one case involving a challenge to the abridgement of an individual's
Second Amendment right since 1939.23 The Supreme Court has con-
sistently declined to provide a definitive ruling on whether the Second
Amendment guarantees an individual right. Meanwhile, there is an
abundance of historical writing that substantially supports the individ-
ual rights model. Because of the volume of writing on the subject, I
have selected several of these writings to be discussed in greater detail.
III. THE MISGIVINGS OF UNITED STATES V. MILLER
United States v. Miller is the case that gun control advocates
love to cite. The Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence advances
Miller because it was interpreted as adopting the militia interpretation
of the Second Amendment.
24
Miller involved two men who were charged with unlawfully
transporting an unregistered, double barreled shotgun in interstate
19. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
20. U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (holding that government regulation is
sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional powers of the Government; if it furthers
important or substantial government interest that does not burden another constitutional
right, "it is a familiar principle of Constitutional laws that this court will not strike down an
otherwise Constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.") Id.
21. See The National Firearms Act of 1934, 26 U.S.C. § 53, amended by Pub. L. No.
111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009); (citing to Congress's Congressional power to regulate interstate
commerce and of taxation to regulate certain classes of firearms); Federal Firearms Act of
1938, 15 U.S.C. § 18, repealed by The Gun Control Act of 1968, repealed by Pub. L. No. 97-
79, § 9(b)(2), 95 Stat. 1079 (1981); Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 922,
invalidated by U.S. v. Martinez, 2009 WL 522939, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2009); Brady
Handgun Violence Protection Act of 1993, 18 U.S.C. § 921-922 (1993); Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, H.R. 3355, 103d Cong. (1994); Gun Free School Zones Act
of 1990, (current version at Crime Control Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 1702, Pub. L. 101-647
(1990).
22. See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2788 (2008) (5-4 decision) (Scalia J.,
plurality opinion) (holding there is a fundamental right to bear arms in the home for
protection).
23. See generally United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
24. The Second Amendment, Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence (2007),
available at http://www.bradycampaign.org/facts/issues?page=second (hereinafter "Brady
Campaign") (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
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commerce that was lacking a tax stamp. 25 Jack Miller and Frank Law-
ton were charged with violations under the National Firearms Act of
1934 (hereinafter "The Act").26 The purpose of the Act was to quell the
public fear that was prevalent during the prohibition era when mob
executions frequently occurred. Many of these mob executions were
carried out utilizing the Thompson machine gun as the mob's weapon
of choice.
27
The Act required that every person possessing a firearm regis-
ter the weapon in the district where he resided or where the weapon
was usually kept.28 The Act defined the term "firearm" to include a
shotgun or rifle having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length,
"or any other weapon except a pistol or revolver .... capable of being
concealed on the person, or a machine gun, and include[d] a muffler or
silencer for any firearm whether or not such firearm [was] included
within the foregoing definition."
29
The District Court held that Section 11 of The Act violated
Miller and Lawton's Second Amendment rights.30 But in overturning
the District Court's decision, the Supreme Court opined:
It is not within judicial notice that a shotgun having a barrel of less
than eighteen inches in length is any part of ordinary military
equipment, or that its use could contribute to the common
defense.31
Clearly, the Court erred in Miller when it carved out this judi-
cially-created rule, pulled from proverbial left-field. The Miller Court
made no inquiry into the historical evolution of firearms in this coun-
try. Nor did the Court allocate proper weight or authority to the
historical writings which indicate that able-bodied men who were
called upon to provide for the common defense were expected to be pro-
ficient in the use of firearms that they were required to have purchased
25. Miller, 307 U.S. at 175.
26. Id.
27. Greg S. Weaver, Firearm Deaths, Gun availability, and Legal Regulatory Changes:
Suggestions from the Data, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 823 (2002) (mentioning Al
Capone's use of the Thompson machine gun to attack a rival bootlegger, launch an arms war
amongst gangsters in Chicago, and killing a state prosecutor).
28. Miller, 307 U.S. at 175.
29. Id. at 175.
30. Id. at 177 (citing Section 11 of The Act, "It shall be unlawful for any person who is
required to register as provided in section 5 hereof and who shall not have so registered, or
any other person who has not in his possession a stamp-affixed order as provided in section
4 hereof, to ship, carry, or deliver any firearm in interstate commerce").
31. Id. at 177, (citing Aymette v. State of Tennessee, 21 Tenn. 154, 158 (1840)).
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using their own funds.32 Instead, the Court chose not to pay homage to
the historical evidence which existed and showed that militia weapons
with barrels of less than eighteen inches existed as early as the 17th
century. 3
3
Unfortunately for proponents of the individual rights model of
the Second Amendment, Miller did not articulate a definitive position
as to whether an individual right exists to keep and bear arms.
Rather, the Court's reasoning focused on the length of the barrel of the
firearms "most commonly utilized by the militias of the day."34 The
Miller opinion references Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations Book V. Ch.
I which stated: "[M]en of republican principles have been jealous of a
standing army as dangerous to liberty. In a militia, the character of
the labourer, artificer, or tradesman, predominates over that of the sol-
dier. . ." However, the Miller Court did not afford this insightful
observation due consideration. 35
Smith clearly recognized that the militia needed to be different
in character than the standing army. The militia was to be comprised
of ordinary men and was to outnumber and be superior in character to
that of the standing army soldier.3 6 In identifying that our military
force needed to be comprised of two different factions, Smith recog-
nized that the concept of a standing army posed a significant obstacle
to ensuring the liberty of the people if such an army was directed by a
tyrannical government.37 This finding supports the theory that ordi-
nary people were meant to have the right to keep and bear arms
separately from the standing military. Smith's statement seemingly
incorporates the checks and balances system into the concept of a
standing military.
Unfortunately, the Miller Court missed the mark when it failed
to state with clarity whether or not an individual has a personal right
to keep and bear arms. Although gun control advocates cite Miller
with regularity, they erroneously regard the Court's decision therein
as advancing the position that the Constitution does not guarantee an
individual right to keep and bear arms.38 However, as will be dis-
cussed, history and tradition tell a different story.
32. See id. at 179; See also Don B. Kates and Gary Mauser, Would Banning Firearms
Reduce Murder and Suicide?, HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 668, 679-80 (2007).
33. Answers.com, http://answers.com/topic/blunderbuss (last visited Mar. 5, 2009).
34. Miller, 307 U.S. at 180 (muskets with barrels less than eighteen inches).
35. Id. at 179.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Brady Campaign, supra note 24.
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IV. ARE THE COURTS FINALLY BEGINNING TO UNDERSTAND THE
SECOND AMENDMENT?
The Brady Campaign called the court's initial decision in U.S. v.
Emerson, a "renegade decision." 39 Emerson involved a man who owned
a Beretta nine millimeter handgun. Emerson filed all paperwork re-
quired by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives
(BATFE), and at the time of purchase, he was not subject to any pend-
ing criminal action, nor was he subject to a restraining order for
domestic violence.40 However, subsequent to the purchase of the fire-
arm, Emerson's wife began to carry on an extramarital affair.41
Emerson's wife testified that he had not assaulted her, but that he did
threaten to kill her lover.42 Upon hearing the testimony of Mr. Emer-
son's wife, the District Court issued a temporary restraining order
against Emerson.43 The restraining order enjoined Emerson from en-
gaging in twenty-two enumerated acts which included, but were not
limited to, threatening any unlawful action against any person, caus-
ing injury to any person, or threatening any person with imminent
bodily injury.
44
Although Emerson never carried out the threat, he was subse-
quently charged with possessing a firearm while being subject to a
restraining order. 45 The first case against Emerson was dismissed by
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. 46 The Dis-
trict Court found that the domestic violence statute at issue amounted
to nothing more than a boilerplate statute and reinstated Emerson's
Second Amendment rights.
47
The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision, but in
doing so, it opined that the Second Amendment does guarantee an in-
39. Id. (citing Emerson, 46 F. Supp. at 599).
40. U.S. v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 211, 216 (5th Cir. 2001).
41. Id. at 211 (citing Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 599).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 211.
44. Id. The restraining order enjoined Mr. Emerson from engaging in twenty-two
enumerated acts which included, but were not limited to: threatening to take unlawful
action against Emerson's wife or any person; causing bodily injury to Emerson's wife or to a
child of either party; or threatening Emerson's wife or a child of either party with imminent
bodily injury.
45. Id. at 211-12.
46. Id. at 212.
47. Id. at 260 (The District Court found that the domestic violence statute at issue
amounted to nothing more than a "boilerplate order" and reinstated Emerson's Second
Amendment rights).
2009
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dividual right.48 The Court explained that it was appropriate to
abridge Emerson's Second Amendment rights as long as the state could
demonstrate a narrowly tailored means in abridging the right.49 The
Court's use of the words "narrowly tailored" is significant because such
use indicates that the Court applied a strict scrutiny analysis to the
case. The Court appears to have concluded that the state met its bur-
den of demonstrating a compelling interest in curtailing domestic
violence, and achieved its means through narrowly tailored channels.50
In a clearly written opinion, the Court of Appeals unequivocally
concluded that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual
right.51 The Emerson Court went to great lengths in both its research
and its investigation by reviewing several previously decided cases in-
volving the Second Amendment, considering the writings of several
constitutional scholars, reviewing various state ratifications, and dis-
secting the language used in the Second Amendment. 52 This level of
diligence is what the Miller decision unfortunately lacked. 53
The Emerson Court acknowledged that the individual rights in-
terpretation of the Second Amendment has received "considerable
academic endorsement" over the last two decades and paid attention to
the findings therein.54 Rejecting the collective rights model, the Court
48. Id. at 260-61.
49. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 261.
50. Id. at 213-14 (by abridging only Mr. Emerson's Second Amendment rights).
51. Id. at 260-61.
52. Id. at 221-60.
53. See generally CLAYTON E. CRAMER, ARMED AMERICA, THE REMARKABLE STORY OF
How AND WHY THE GUNS BECAME As AMERICAN AS APPLE PIE (Stetson Current 1996). As
identified herein, the historical evidence supports that weapons with barrel lengths of less
than eighteen inches did, in fact exist, and were used in conjunction with militia service.
This historical evidence was neither investigated nor discussed by the Miller Court.
54. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 220 (acknowledging Scott Bursor, Toward a Functional
Framework for Interpreting the Second Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1125 (1996); Robert J.
Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Fifth Auxiliary Right, 104 YALE L.J. 995 (1995);
Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the Constitution or the Predilection of Judges
Reign?, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 65 (1983); Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right of the People or the
Power of the State: Bearing Arms, Arming Militias, and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U.
L. REV. 131 (1991); Stephen P. Halbrook, What the Framers Intended:A Linguistic Analysis
of the Right to "Bear Arms", 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151 (1986); Don B. Kates, Jr., The
Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 87 (1992); Don
B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82
MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99
YALE L.J. 637 (1989); Nelson Lund, The Ends of Second Amendment Jurisprudence:
Firearms Disabilities and Domestic Violence Restraining Orders, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 157
(1999); Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual's Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REV.
1 (1996); Glenn H. Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV.
461 (1995); Robert E. Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J. AM.
HIST. 599 1982); William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to
122
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opined that Miller was decided in its entirety based upon the length of
the barrel of the firearm. 55 Writing for the Emerson majority, Judge
Garwood, stated:
We believe it is entirely clear that the Supreme Court decided
Miller on the basis of the government's second argument, that a
'shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length' as
stated in the National Firearms Act is not . . . one of the 'Arms'
which the Second Amendment prohibits infringement of the right of
the people to keep and bear-and not on the basis of the govern-
ment's first argument (that the Second Amendment protects the
right of the people to keep and bear no character of 'arms' when not
borne in actual, active service in the militia...).56
The Emerson Court also reviewed Cases v. United States.57 In
Cases, the Court also determined that Miller was decided "entirely on
the type of weapon involved not having any reasonable relationship to
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia."58 The Cases
Court opined:
[W]e do not feel that the Supreme Court in this case [Miller] was
attempting to formulate a general rule applicable to all cases. The
rule which it laid down was adequate to dispose of the case before it
and that we think was as far as the Supreme Court intended to
go." 5 9
Cases went on to hold:
Considering the many variable factors bearing upon the question it
seems to us impossible to formulate any general test by which to
determine the limits imposed by the Second Amendment but that
each case under it, like cases under the due process clause, must be
decided on its own facts . . .60
Based on the foregoing, the Cases Court appears to acknowl-
edge that compliance with the Fifth Amendment's due process clause
requires each Second Amendment case to be considered on its own
merits. Cases seemingly rejects the application of any general rule
that would consider the character of the firearm - whether or not the
firearm was of the character of weapons commonly utilized by the mili-
tia at the time our founders drafted the Constitution.
Arms, 43 DuKE L.J. 1236 (1994); Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 793 (1998).
55. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 224.
56. Id.
57. See generally Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1942).
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More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia announced its decision in Parker v. The District of
Columbia (hereinafter "the District"). Parker involved a challenge to
the District of Columbia's gun control laws. 61 The case was filed by six
individual residents of the District of Columbia (hereinafter "D.C.")
and alleged that D.C.'s gun control laws violated their Second Amend-
ment rights.62 The decision by the Court of Appeals followed the lower
court's dismissal of the matter on standing grounds. 63
Because of the lack of binding legal precedent, the Court of Ap-
peals began its analysis by examining the text of the Second
Amendment. 64 The Court considered several of the sources cited
herein and definitively reached the conclusion that the Second Amend-
ment is an individual right guaranteed by the Constitution.65 This
holding is significant because the Constitution does give Congress the
power to regulate for general welfare only in the District of Colum-
bia.66 Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals concluded that residents of
the District of Columbia do not forfeit their Constitutional rights sim-
ply by residing therein.67
The Court advances the theory that the Second Amendment is a
federal right and as such, is guaranteed by the Constitution.68 The
Court dissected both the Second Amendment's prefatory and operative
clauses and considered the significance of the placement of the comma
which separates the two clauses. 69 Appellant Parker argued that the
Amendment's operative clause guarantees the individual right to bear
arms.70 Conversely, the District argued that the prefatory clause
states the Amendment's main purpose was aimed at "shield[ing] state
militias from federal encroachment."71 Additionally, the District ar-
gued that the Second Amendment "protects private possession of
weapons only in connection with performance of civic duties as part of
a well-regulated citizens militia organized for the security of a free
state."
72
61. Parker, 478 F.3d 370, 372 (2007).
62. Id. at 373.
63. Id. at 370, 402.
64. Id. at 380-381.
65. Id. at 381.
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, sect. 8. cls. 17.
67. Parker, 478 F.3d at 395.
68. Id.






The District asked that the court accept its argument that the
phrase "a well regulated Militia" applied only to the organized militias
which were prevalent during the time of our founders; and that be-
cause militias no longer exist, "invocation of the Second Amendment
right is conditioned upon service in a defunct institution."73 During
oral argument, counsel for the District argued that there is, in fact, no
type of law that would violate the Second Amendment.74 Moreover,
the District's counsel advanced the theory that it would be constitu-
tional for D.C. to ban the fourteen firearms at issue in this case
outright.75 The Court interpreted this argument to mean that D.C.
views the Second Amendment as "a dead letter."76
Interpreting the meaning of the words "the people," the Court
opined that the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments
were all designed to "protect the interests of individuals against gov-
ernment intrusion, interference, or usurpation."77  Moreover, in
concluding that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual
right, the Court found that "the most important word is the one the
drafters chose to describe the holders of the right: "the people".78 The
Court acknowledged that the individual rights model has received con-
siderable support from the "great legal treatises of the nineteenth
century," as well as more recent support from former Attorney General
John Ashcroft. 7
9
The Parker decision supports a central tenant of this paper,
which is, that the rights bestowed upon "the people" through the Sec-
ond Amendment are deserving of the same treatment and respect that
the rights receive in the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Tenth
Amendments. Writing for the Parker majority, Judge Silberman
opined:
We . . . note that the Tenth Amendment-"The powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the peo-
ple"-indicates that the authors of the Bill of Rights were perfectly
capable of distinguishing between "the people," on the one hand,
and "the states," on the other. The natural reading of "the right of




77. Id. at 381.
78. Id.
79. Parker, 478 F.3d at 380-81.
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the people" in the Second Amendment would accord with usage
elsewhere in the Bill of Rights.
80
Judge Silberman also noted that the Supreme Court's holding
in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, "endorsed a uniform reading of
'the people' across the Bill of Rights."8' The Court in Verdugo-Ur-
quidez specifically considered both the Constitution and Bill of Rights'
use of the word "people."8 2 Holding that the Fourth Amendment does
not protect the rights of non-citizens on foreign soil, the Verdugo-Ur-
quidez Court wrote:
"[T]he people" seems to have been a term of art employed in select
parts of the Constitution. The Preamble declares that the Constitu-
tion is ordained and established by "the People of the United
States." The Second Amendment protects "the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms," and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments pro-
vide that certain rights and powers are retained by and reserved to
"the people.". . . [T]his textual exegesis ... suggests that "the peo-
ple" protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and
Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved
in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons
who are part of a national community... 83
The Parker Court found the Supreme Court's discussion in
Verdugo-Urquidez to be indicative, if not definitive, that "the people" in
the Second Amendment should not be "restricted to a small subset of
'the people' meriting protection under the other Amendments' use of
that same term."8 4 According to Judge Silberman, this finding led to
the Court's conclusion in Parker that the "right of the people," when
read in context and in light of Supreme Court precedent, guarantees
that the Second Amendment is an individual right.
8 5
V. WHY THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
Legal teachings are inconsistent with regard to whether each of
the first eight Amendments has been incorporated to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. There are writings that indicate
that the Second Amendment has not been incorporated.8 6 Addition-
80. Id. at 381.
81. Id. at 328 (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)).
82. Parker, 478 F.3d at 381-82.
83. Id. at 382.
84. Id. at 382.
85. Id. at 395.
86. Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Heller's Future in the Lower Courts, 102
Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 406, 411 (2008); Stephen P. Halbrook, Only Law Enforcement will
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ally, the Fifth Amendment's complete incorporation is also subject to
debate.8
7
However, the Fifth Amendment's Liberty and Due Process
clauses have been incorporated to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.88 Jesse Choper's, Constitutional Law, Cases-Comments-
Questions, denotes that the "total incorporation" position received sup-
port from the dissenting justices in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46
(1947).89 Distinguishing Adamson from Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78 (1908), and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), Justices
Black and Douglas opined:
[We] cannot consider the Bill of Rights to be an outworn 18th Cen-
tury 'straight jacket' as the Twining opinion did. It is true that they
were designed to meet ancient evils. But they are the same kind of
human evils that have emerged from century to century whenever
excessive power is sought by few at the expense of many.90
This writing is significant because Justices Black and Douglas
identified the possibility of people in power advancing ill-intentioned
agendas at the expense of "the people." Justices Black and Douglas
further considered the importance of the concept of liberty when they
wrote:
... [Tihe people of no nation can lose their liberty so long as a Bill of
Rights like ours survives and its basic purposes are conscientiously
interpreted, enforced, and respected so as to afford continuous pro-
be Allowed to Have Guns: Hurricane Katrina and the New Orleans Firearm Confiscations,
18 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 339, 347 (2008); George A. Mocsary, Explaining Away the
Obvious: The Infeasibility of Characterizing the Second Amendment as a Nonindividual
Right, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2113, 2169 (2008).
87. CHOPER, JESSE H., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS, 361 (10th
ed. 2006) (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, (1937), which held that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not encompass at least certain aspects of the double jeopardy prohibition of
the Fifth Amendment; the Twining-Adamson view that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination is not incorporated; Malloy v. Hogan which rejects Twining-
Adamson; and Griffin v. California, 308 U.S. 609 (1965) which rejected the "total
incorporation" interpretation. See also, Choper at 302, quoting Louis Henkin, Selective
Incorporation in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74, 79, 80-81 (1963) To hold that
a particular provision of the Bill of Rights is not totally 'incorporated,' i.e., not binding on
the states in its entirety, is not to say it is completely 'out' of the Fourteenth Amendment.
88. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (holding that the Fifth Amendment is
incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment); Chicago, B. & Q.R.
Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897) (holding the takings clause is incorporated
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Palko v. State of Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937).
89. CHOPER, supra note 87 at 361.
90. Id.
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tection against old, as well as new, devices and practices which
might thwart those purposes. 91
Justices Black and Douglas seem to have concluded that the
original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to extend to all
people of our nation "the complete protection of the Bill of Rights."
92
(Emphasis added). With this reasoning in mind, it makes logical sense
to conclude that the Fifth Amendment has been incorporated to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Notably, the act of incor-
poration prohibits the federal and state governments from abridging
the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights without meet-
ing the highest level of scrutiny.
93
There are two types of rights: enumerated and unenumerated.
Enumerated rights are generally deemed to be fundamental. As such,
they are considered of such great importance that these rights are to be
applied against both the federal and the state governments. 94 Moreo-
ver, enumerated rights are listed in the Constitution. 95 Clearly, there
can be no argument that the Second Amendment's right to keep and
bear arms is listed in the Constitution.
An unenumerated right is not specifically listed in the Constitu-
tion. Unenumerated rights, however, can be elevated to fundamental
status upon showing that the right is of such importance that it should
be protected against government intrusion. Once an unenumerated
right is determined to be fundamental, neither the federal government,
nor a state government may abridge the right without showing a com-
pelling interest in abridging the right by means that are narrowly
tailored to meet a necessary government objective.
96
The dissenting opinion in Adamson supports the position that
the Fifth Amendment has been incorporated to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. 97 This support, albeit helpful, is not critical
to the contention that the right to "keep and bear arms" may not be
abridged by any branch of the government, federal or state, without
meeting the most demanding level of scrutiny, which is strict scrutiny.
The enumeration of the Fifth Amendment when read in context with
91. Choper, supra note 87, at 361.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1605.
94. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969); see also Palko v. State of
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323-325 (1937).
95. U.S. CONST. amend. IX; Kurt T. Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth
Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REV. 895, 901 (2008).
96. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. V; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
97. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 124 (1947).
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the Second Amendment, grants fundamental status to the Second
Amendment. This fundamental status makes the Second Amend-
ment's right of "the people" to keep and bear arms an aspect of liberty.
Therefore, in order to abridge the right, the government must show a
compelling interest in abridging the fundamental right, and the means
selected must be narrowly tailored toward accomplishing the stated
objective.
98
VI. ESTABLISHING A RIGHT AS FUNDAMENTAL
To establish a right as "fundamental," one must look to history
and tradition. Because the Second Amendment relates to the right of
"the people" to keep and bear arms, one must consider the evolution of
firearms and their use in this country.
The earliest historical accounts related to firearms credit the
Chinese with inventing gunpowder in the 1200's.99 The word "hand
gun" was used for the first time in the 14th century. 10 0 The production
of firearms improved and was advanced as early as the 15th and 16th
centuries. And although the British do not provide an exact date as to
when rifles were first used in war, there is documentation on record
establishing that in as early as 1680 British troops of Life Guards were
supplied with rifled carbines. 10 Moreover, both the British Royal
Navy and the pilgrims were credited with use of the blunderbuss.
10 2
The blunderbuss was a mid-sized weapon, smaller than a shot-
gun but larger than a pistol and was usually fired from the hip.10 3
Significantly, the blunderbuss was a short-barreled weapon. 0 4 Its
compact nature enabled it to be utilized in confined spaces. Therefore,
it was a weapon commonly carried on ships to repel pirates.'0 5 Histori-
cal evidence indicates that this weapon "appeared with surprising
frequency among the civilian population in the United States.
'10 6
98. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996) (explaining strict scrutiny).
99. FREDERICK WILKINSON, HANDGUNS: A COLLECTOR'S GUIDE TO PISTOLS AND
REVOLVERS FROM 1850 TO THE PRESENT, 10-11 (London, Greenwhich ed. 1996).
100. Id.
101. David Minshall, Firearms History, 1998-2007, available at http://inventors.about.
comlgi/dynamic/offsite.htm?zi= l/XJ&sdn=inventors&zu=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.research
press.co.uk%2Ffirearms%2Findex.htm (last visisted Apr. 8, 2009).
102. Cramer, supra note 53, at 238-39.
103. Id.
104. Miller, 307 U.S. at 175 (This feature was especially significant because the court's
decision in Miller focused on the length of the barrel of the gun).
105. Cramer, supra note 53, at 238.
106. Id.
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The evolution of the firearms industry coincides with when our
founding fathers labored over the contents of the Constitution. "The
Colonists took from England the tradition of arming people to ensure
their own safety and peacekeeping duties for the community."107 At
common law there was a recognized need for men to defend themselves
and they were permitted to do so.'
08
Early historical accounts indicate that the colonists feared at-
tacks from both the Indians and other European enemies. 10 9
Additionally, the defense of the early colony was "both prudent and
built" on established English tradition.110 The prevailing philosophy of
the time recognized that a free man was a man who was armed. 1'
Moreover, many militia laws required that all freemen, and in some
cases women heads of household, own guns. 1 2 For example, in the
1638 Act for Military Discipline, Maryland required:
[Tihat every house keeper.. . within this Province shall have ready
continually upon all occasions within his her or their house for him
or themselves and for every person within his her or their house
able to bear armes [sic] one Serviceable fixed gunne [sic] or bastard
musket boare [sic] along with a pound of gunpowder, four pounds of
pistol or musket shot, match for matchlocks and of flints for
firelocks." 13
Laws existed as early as 1724 that required members of the mi-
litia to carry guns to church, while traveling, or attending public
meetings.1' 4 There are even earlier accounts from 1643 in Portsmouth,
Rhode Island, where militia members were ordered to visit each inhab-
itant of Portsmouth to ensure that each man possessed powder and
bullets." 5 Documentation dating back to 1641 indicates that both Ma-
ryland and New Jersey required immigrants to bring with them, guns,
powder, lead, bullets, Pistoll [sic] and Goose [sic] shot."
6
Clearly, the abundance of documented evidence demonstrates
that there is sufficient history and tradition surrounding the Second
107. Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Second Amendment Research Center (quoting Robert J.




110. Cramer, supra note 102.
111. Malcolm, supra note 107.
112. See Cramer, supra note 102, at 4; See also Kates, supra note 32, at 679-80.
113. Cramer, supra note 102, at 7.
114. Id. at 4.
115. Id. at 7.
116. Id. at 8.
A FEDERAL PERSPECTIVE
Amendment. This history and tradition are the necessary elements
needed to declare the Second Amendment a "fundamental" right.
VII. WHAT DO LIBERTY AND DUE PROCESS REALLY MEAN?
Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for the majority in Washington
v. Glucksberg accurately captured the meaning of liberty and due pro-
cess when he wrote:
The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the
'liberty' it protects includes more than the absence of physical re-
straint. The Clause . . .provides heightened protection against
government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty
interests.117 (Emphasis added).
Because enumerated, incorporated rights are fundamental, any
attempt to abridge these rights must be subjected to a substantive due
process analysis. 118 Chief Justice Rehnquist established the frame-
work for interpreting a substantive due process case when he
explained:
Our established method of substantive due process analysis has two
primary features: First,... the Due Process Clause specifically pro-
tects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively,
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' * * * Second,
we have required in substantive due process cases a 'careful
description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest." 9 (Em-
phasis added).
The importance of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion was reiter-
ated by Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Michael H. v. Gerald
D., when he wrote:
"[In] an attempt to limit and guide interpretation of the [due pro-
cess] clause, we have insisted not merely that the interest
denominated as a 'liberty' be 'fundamental' . . . , but also that it be
an interest traditionally protected by our society. . . . [Tihe Due
Process Clause affords only those protections 'so rooted in the tradi-
tions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.'"1 20
117. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997).
118. Id. A substantive due process analysis is the appropriate tool to utilize when the
government is attempting to abridge the fundamental rights of a group of people.
Procedural due process is the appropriate legal application when there is an abridgement of
an individual's rights.
119. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
120. Id. at 466 (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)).
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Therefore, any substantive due process challenge to a law which
abridges an individual's Second Amendment right must be evaluated
after thoroughly examining the history, traditions, and practices re-
lated to firearms ownership in the United States. 121 Upon considering
these elements in their totality, the court must then decide if the
abridgement of the right will pass strict scrutiny.
122
When one fully researches our nation's history and tradition, he
would be hard-pressed to argue with a straight face that gun owner-
ship is not deeply rooted in our nation's longstanding history and
tradition. The framers articulated the need for the people to be armed
in the Federalist Papers.123 Moreover, if one simply stops to consider
the evolution of the firearms industry, taken in conjunction with the
historical accounts of firearms being an inherent part of our history
and tradition, then the Second Amendment, both as an individual right
and as a fundamental aspect of liberty, may not be abridged without
being subjected to the highest level of scrutiny. 124
This author concedes that there have been obvious changes in
society since Colonial times. However, one aspect remains constant,
despite the changing times, our government must act in accordance
with the mandates set forth in the Constitution at all times. Our Con-
stitution is the supreme law of our land and is to be protected by our
courts at all levels. And despite the argument by gun control propo-
nents that the Second Amendment does not guarantee an individual
right or fundamental right, our founding fathers possessed the fore-
sight necessary to ensure that fundamental rights could not be
abridged without showing the most compelling of reasons.
VIII. UNCOVERING ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE SECOND
AMENDMENT AS AN INDIVDUAL ASPECT OF LIBERTY
Looking to the language of the Preamble to the Constitution, it
is clear that the founding fathers unequivocally recognized that due
concern be afforded for the defense, welfare, and liberty needed to en-
sure that the American people lived in a free society. 125 There is no
121. Id. at 472 (citing Glucksberg, 521 U. S. at 720).
122. Id.
123. James Madison, Alexander Hamilton & John Jay, The Federalist Papers, 302
(Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin Books, 1987) (1788) (quoting Madison, "Let us not insult the
free and gallant citizens of America with the suspicion that they would be less able to
defend the rights of which they would be in actual possession than the debased subjects of
arbitrary power would be to rescue theirs from the hands of their oppressors").
124. Cramer, supra note 102.
125. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
132
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language included in the Preamble indicative of a government demon-
strating the intent to assume responsibility for providing for the
common defense of the people. Rather, the words chosen by the foun-
ders indicate that "the people" were to be responsible for ensuring their
own common defense. 126 And although the Preamble "cannot control
the enacting part of a statute ... if any doubt arise on the words of the
enacting part, the [Pireamble may be resorted to, to explain it."127
Our founding fathers considered all aspects of liberty to be of
the utmost importance and as essential components necessary to en-
sure freedom for the American people. Consequently, the liberty and
due process provisions were incorporated into the Fifth Amendment,
which states in relevant part:
No person shall be held to answer for a... crime .... nor shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself, nor shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; .. .128 (Emphasis added).
Constitutional treatise writer Thomas M. Cooley, considered by
legal scholars to be one of the most eminent writers of the nineteenth
century, considering the right of the people to bear arms in their own
defense wrote:
The right of the people to bear arms in their own defence [sic],... ,
is significant as having been reserved by the people as a possible
and necessary resort for the protection of self-government against
usurpation, and against any attempt on the part of those who may
for the time be in possession of State authority or resources to set
aside the constitution and substitute their own rule for that of the
people. Should the contingency ever arise when it would be neces-
sary for the people to make use of the arms in their hands for the
protection of constitutional liberty, the proceeding, so far from being
revolutionary, would be in strict accord with popular right and
duty.12 9 (Emphasis added).
Cooley identified two significant principles in this writing.
First, that keeping and bearing arms was a right of the people which
was designed to protect against the possibility of a tyrannical govern-
ment someday usurping the rights of the people. Second, and more
importantly, Cooley identified that "the people" had the right to bear
126. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
127. See generally Emerson, 270 F.3d at 233.
128. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
129. Levinson Sandford, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 649
(1989) (quoting Thomas Cooley, The General Principles of Constitutional Law in the United
States of America, 298 (3d ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1898)).
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arms for the protection of constitutional liberty. 130 The very inclusion
of the words "constitutional liberty" lends credence to the position that
the right of the people to bear arms is a liberty interest and a funda-
mental right which may not be abridged by the government without
being subjected to the highest level of scrutiny.
In his article The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to
Arms, constitutional law professor William Van Alstyne opines that
Justice Cooley "accurately recapitulated the controlling circumstances"
in his nineteenth century treatise when Cooley wrote the following:13 '
The Second Amendment . . . was adopted with some modification
... from the English Bill of Rights of 1688, where it stood as a
protest against arbitrary action of the overturned dynasty in dis-
arming the people, and as a pledge of the new rulers that this
tyrannical action should cease. . . The Right is General . . The
meaning of the provision undoubtedly is that the people from whom
the militia must be taken, shall have the right to keep and bear
arms; and they need no permission or regulation of law for this
purpose."132
Professor Van Alstyne also addressed the Second Amendment's
"deep historical antecedents" in his article entitled The Culture of the
Gun.' 33 Van Alstyne identified the writings of English jurist William
Blackstone in a 1765 legal treatise wherein Blackstone identified sev-
eral "primary" natural rights. According to Blackstone, "primary"
rights included the "free enjoyment of personal liberty."'134 Addition-
ally, Blackstone identified "auxiliary" natural rights which included
"the right of having and using arms for self-preservation and de-
fense." 135 (Emphasis added).
And as discussed supra, while the Courts in Parker and Emer-
son have adopted the individual rights model, there are additional
court opinions which also addressed the advancement of the individual
rights model in dicta. In Printz v. U.S., Justice Thomas opined:
"[I]n Miller, we determined that the Second Amendment did not
guarantee a citizen's right to possess a sawed-off shotgun because
that weapon had not been shown to be 'ordinary military equip-
130. William Van Alstyne, The Personal Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43
DuKE L.J. 1236, 1247 (1994).
131. Id.
132. See id.; see also Cooley, supra note 129, at 298.
133. Robert Bliwise, The Culture of the Gun, DuKE MAGAZINE, Vol. 87, No. 3, March-
April 2001, available at http://www.dukemagazine.duke.edu/dukemag/issues/030401/





ment' that could 'contribute to the common defense.' The Court did
not, however, attempt to define, or otherwise construe, the substan-
tive right protected by the Second Amendment." 136
Justice Thomas's writing is significant because it recognizes the
Second Amendment as a "substantive right." Moreover, Justice
Thomas's opinion is significant because it seemingly indicates that the
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms belongs with other
personal rights that have been considered qualified aspects of liberty.
The right to keep and bear arms is specifically the type of right that
the Fifth Amendment's due process provision was designed to
protect. 137
IX. STRICT SCRUTINY APPLIES TO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: So WHY
Is THERE STILL DEBATE REGARDING WHETHER THE SECOND
AMENDMENT IS AN INDIVIDUAL AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS?
The Court has consistently held that fundamental rights must
be subjected to strict scrutiny, the highest level of scrutiny. Therefore,
any time the government seeks to abridge a fundamental right, it must
show a compelling interest and a narrowly tailored means to meet the
stated objective. 138 Once a Plaintiff alleges his fundamental rights
have been abridged, he must be able to establish a prima facia case.
Once this is accomplished, the burden shifts to the government to
demonstrate a compelling interest in abridging the fundamental right.
The government must also show that the means chosen to fulfill the
stated interest have been narrowly tailored to meet the government's
objective.
X. INTERPRETING THE SECOND AMENDMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTY OF THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
To fully comprehend the meaning of the Second Amendment, all
of its words must be read together. Additionally, the Second Amend-
ment must be read within the confines of the Constitution's Preamble
and the other Amendments which set forth rights retained by the
people. 139
136. Printz, 521 U.S. 898, 946 (1997).
137. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
138. Halbrook, supra note 86, at 185; Philip J. Prygoski, Abortion and the Right to Die:
Judicial Imposition of a Theory of Life, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 67, 75 (1992).
139. U.S. CONST. amend. I, IV, V, VI, IX, X, and XIV.
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The Preamble "provide[s] for the common defense, promote[s]
the general Welfare, and secure [s] the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity." The First Amendment speaks of ". . . [t]he right of
the people to peacefully assemble." (Emphasis added). The Fourth
Amendment speaks of ".... [tihe right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects. . . ." (Emphasis added). The Fifth
Amendment provides that "No person shall.., be deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law. . . ." The Ninth
Amendment provides that "[tihe enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others re-
tained by the people." (Emphasis added). The Tenth Amendment holds
that "Powers not delegated to the United States .... nor prohibited by
... the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
(Emphasis added). Finally, Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
reads in relevant part, ". . . nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
When looking at the Constitution as a whole, why then is there
so much confusion surrounding the meaning of the Second Amend-
ment? Why would the meaning of the words "the people" taken in
context with the Second Amendment bestow any lesser rights to "the
people" than "the people" receive in the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth,
Tenth or Fourteenth Amendments? The language of the Second
Amendment is clear and its interpretation is commonsensical.
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed. (Emphasis added).
In each of the Constitutional Amendments discussed supra, the
meaning of "the people" is neither subject to confusion nor debate. The
term is afforded its common meaning. Black's Law Dictionary defined
"people" as "[t]he citizens of a state as represented by the prosecution
in a criminal case."'140 Webster's Dictionary defines "people" as: "n.pl.
1. human beings 2. a populace 3. one's family."
14 1
The Court's insightful observation in Emerson likewise accepts
this commonsensical position. Writing for the Court, Judge Garwood
stated:
The individual rights model,... does not require that any special or
unique meaning be attributed to the word "people." It gives the
same meaning to the words "the people" as used in the Second
Amendment phrase "the right of the people" as when used in the
140. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY, 1156, Deluxe, 7th ed., (1990).
141. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD POCKET DICTIONARY, 2nd ed., (1993).
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exact same phrase in the contemporaneously submitted and rati-
fied First and Fourth Amendments. 14 2 (Emphasis added).
There is no evidence in either the text of the Second Amend-
ment, or in other parts of the Constitution, that the words "the people"
have a different meaning than when used elsewhere. 143 The Emerson
Court specifically discussed use of the words "the people" as they re-
lated to both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments:
.. . [Tihe text of the Constitution, . . . strongly suggests that the
words "the people" have precisely the same meaning within the Sec-
ond Amendment... as without. . . . [A]s used throughout the
Constitution, "the people" have "rights" and "powers," but federal
and state governments only have "powers" or "authority", [sic]
never "rights."144
Therefore, it is hard to logically imagine any interpretation of
the Second Amendment that does not vest ultimate power with the
people, other than that the framers intended to have a trained militia,
and ready to assemble when called upon to defend the United States.
In Federalist No. 46, James Madison, considering the breadth of
power the federal and state governments, wrote:
... [I]nquire whether the federal government or the State govern-
ments will have the advantage with regard to the predilection and
support of the people. . . . [W]e must consider both of them as sub-
stantially dependent on the great body of citizens of the United
States.... They must be told that the ultimate authority, wherever
the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone .... 145
(Emphasis added).
Clearly, Madison intended to grant broad powers to "the people"
to ensure that interference from an overzealous government would be
kept to a minimum. Moreover, Madison articulated a clear distinction
between the militia and "the people." When pondering the conse-
quences of an overzealous federal government, Madison wrote:
... I would not be going too far to say that the State governments
with the people on their side would be able to repel the danger....
To these would be opposed a militia ... with arms in their hands,
officered by men chosen from and among themselves, fighting for
their common liberties and united and conducted by governments
possessing their affections and confidence. 146
142. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 261.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 228.
145. James Madison, Alexander Hamilton & John Jay, The Federalist Papers, 297
(Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin Books 1987) (1788).
146. Id. at 301.
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In Professor Van Alstyne's article entitled The Second Amend-
ment and the Personal Right to Arms, Van Alsytne writes:
... [t]he Bill of Rights was . . . produced by Madison, in the first
Constitution to assemble under the new Constitution, in 1789. Ac-
cordingly, as with 'the freedom of the press,' the protection of 'the
right of the people to keep and bear arms' was thus made doubly
secure in the Bill of Rights.147 (Emphasis added).
Professor Van Alstyne makes the correlation between the
"rights of the people" as guaranteed by the First Amendment to the
same "rights of the people" annunciated in the Second Amendment.
However, as Professor Van Alstyne points out, while there is an abun-
dance of case law interpreting the First Amendment, there is an
uncontroverted lack of decisive case law interpreting the Second
Amendment, or more importantly, advancing the argument that the
Second Amendment is a fundamental personal right.14
8
[I]n the case of the Second Amendment, . . . , that jurisprudence is
even now not possible until something more in the case law of the
Second Amendment begins finally to fall into place. That 'some-
thing more,'.., requires one to consider.., that ... the NRA is not
wrong, . . . in its general second amendment stance.. 149
In an in-depth study of the varying interpretations of the Sec-
ond Amendment, former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft's office
reached a definitive conclusion regarding whether the Second Amend-
ment is a personal right. The Opinion entitled, "Whether the Second
Amendment Secures an Individual Right" considered the Constitution
as a whole document, and examined the history surrounding the Sec-
ond Amendment. The Opinion concluded that the Second Amendment
"secures a personal right of individuals. " 15 0
The Opinion acknowledged that "reasonable restrictions" may
be imposed on select individuals to prevent the unfit and those with
criminal propensities from possessing firearms. 151 (Emphasis added).
However, the Opinion explicitly states that ay restrictions placed on
an individual's right to keep and bear arms must be limited to "reason-
able restrictions." 152 Use of the word "reasonable" is significant
147. Van Alsytne, William, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Bear
Arms, 43 DuKE L.J. 1236, 1247 (1994).
148. Id. at 1240-41.
149. Id. at 1241.
150. Whether the Second Amendment Secures an Individual Right, Op. Off. Legal
Counsel, 62 (2004); available at 2004 WL 2930974.
151. Id. at 1.
152. Id. at 2.
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because in a legal context, reasonableness is to be determined from an
objective perspective. 15 3 Any test of reasonableness must be consid-
ered from the vantage point of the objective reasonable person and not
the person who opposes the individual right to bear arms.
The Opinion also highlighted an Executive Directive issued by
President Roosevelt as it related to the 1941 Property Requisition Act.
Recognizing the fundamental right of individuals to keep and bear
arms, Roosevelt's directive explicitly "prohibited requisitioning or new
registration, 'of any firearms possessed by any individual for his per-
sonal protection or sport' and moreover, any impairing or infringing of
'the right of any individual to keep and bear arms"'.
154
The Opinion highlights just when Congress and the Courts be-
gan to go astray by misinterpreting the Second Amendment following
Miller. In 1965, former Attorney General Katzenbach endorsed the
collective rights interpretation of the Second Amendment.155 Thereaf-
ter, during perhaps the Court's most liberal period in history, the
tables turned against the individual rights model. By 1968, Congress
enacted the first major federal gun legislation since Miller, the Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.156  From this point forward,
Circuit Courts were split on what interpretation should be applied to
the Second Amendment.157
However, under President Ronald Reagan's visionary leader-
ship, the pendulum once again began to swing back in favor of the
individual rights model. In the 1986 Firearm Owners' Protection Act,
Reagan recognized "the right[ ] of citizens .. .to keep and bear arms
under the second amendment." 58 Thereafter, some of the more con-
servative courts began recognizing that the Second Amendment
secures an individual right. Their actions seemingly coincided with
the numerous scholarly writings advanced by notable modern constitu-
tional scholars who have researched and uncovered vast writings and
historical precedent in support of the individual rights model.
Professor Van Alstyne's article was first published in 1994.
Justice Thomas issued his insightful concurrence in Printz v. United
States, recognizing that a "growing body of scholarly commentary indi-
153. Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 423 (2004).
154. Id. at 4 (citing the Property Requisition Act, ch. 445, Sect. 1, 55 Stat. 742).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 5.
157. Id. (noting that the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits thereafter
adopted the collective-rights view; while the First, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
adopted the quasi-collective rights view).
158. Id. at 7.
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eating that the right is a personal one" has surfaced in recent years.159
And taking notice of the abundance of scholarly writing on point, Jus-
tice Thomas rightfully acknowledged that the Second Amendment
"contain[s] an express limitation on the Government's authority."160
Acknowledging that the Supreme Court has declined to address
the Second Amendment since its 1939 decision in Miller, Justice
Thomas writes:
"This Court has not had recent occasion to consider the nature of
the substantive right safeguarded by the Second Amendment....
If... the Second Amendment is read to confer a personal right to
"keep and bear arms," a colorable argument exists that the Federal
Government's regulatory scheme, . . .as it pertains to the purely
intrastate sale or possession of firearms, runs afoul of that Amend-
ment's protections.... Perhaps, at some future date, this Court will
have the opportunity to determine whether Justice Story was cor-
rect when he wrote that the right to bear arms "has justly been
considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic."' 6 '
Justice Thomas's writing is significant for several reasons.
First, Justice Thomas identifies the Second Amendment as a "substan-
tive right." This categorization lends support to the argument that the
Second Amendment is a fundamental right which may not be abridged
without meeting strict scrutiny. Second, Justice Thomas recognized
that the Federal Government has in recent years enacted regulatory
firearms laws which have been aimed at abridging fundamental rights.
Finally, but perhaps most importantly, Justice Thomas seemingly indi-
cates that Justice Story was correct in asserting that the right to bear
arms "has justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a
republic." 6
2
Fortunately, some courts are beginning to acknowledge these
insightful arguments. The Court's 2001 decision in Emerson, and the
2007 decision by the D.C. Court of Appeals in Parker, may be an indi-
cation that the Supreme Court might be ready to reconsider putting
the issue of the Second Amendment to rest.
159. Printz, 521 U.S. at 946 (1997).
160. Id. at 938.
161. Id. at 938-39.
162. Id. (Use of the words, "palladium of the liberties," further supports the position
that early legal minds determined that the Second Amendment should be considered a
fundamanetal right and an aspect of liberty).
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XI. ATTEMPTS TO EVISCERATE THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
MODEL OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
Consider that when the court issued its opinion in Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), there was noted public opposition to the
court's decision not to recognize black people as citizens. 16 3 Contrast
the public support at the time of the Dred Scott decision, to the mod-
ern-day gun control proponents who are well-adept at garnering public
support for their constitutionally erroneous position.164 If public opin-
ion polls were conducted, and legislators bowed to public pressure as
they do so often today, Dred Scott most certainly would have seen a
different outcome. However, the judiciary does not possess the author-
ity to take public opinion into account just because a segment of the
public shares a certain viewpoint.
Congress must be reminded that the Constitution does not
grant it the power to regulate for the general welfare. When the legis-
lative branch acts, it must always point to a specific provision in the
Constitution that has granted it the power to enact any proposed law.
Equally frightening is the thought that although the judiciary is
not supposed to legislate from the bench, at various times during the
court's history, the judiciary has crafted laws that our original foun-
ders could have never contemplated. Not surprisingly, these court-
crafted innovations deviate from what is required under the Constitu-
tion, which is that the Court act as our nation's "interpreter" of laws. 16 5
Rarely, if ever, do societal views remain stagnant. While we
cannot always count on our elected officials and the courts to do the
right thing, one variable remains constant; the Constitution was rati-
fied as a protective mechanism for the American people. Our
163. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 426 (1857) ("No one, we presume, supposes
that any change in public opinion or feeling in relation to this unfortunate race, in the
civilized nations of Europe or in this country, should induce the court to give the words of
the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than there were intended to bear
when the instrument was framed and adopted.").
164. See David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU
L. REV. 1359, 1450 (R-N.Y) in support of the Civil Rights Bill: "Make the colored man a
citizen of the United States under the laws and the Constitution of the United States ... a
right to defend himself and his wife and his children; a right to bear arms. ... "
165. See U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (Justice Ginsburg, for the majority,
applying an "exceedingly persuasive justification" standard to an Equal Protection
Challenge based on gender discrimination; as opposed to the standard of intermediate
scrutiny as opined by Justice Scalia in the dissent); See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (applying the "undue burden test"
for a woman seeking an abortion).
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Constitution must be defended with vigilance against any attempt to
usurp the rights granted to us as Americans.
XII. CONCLUSION
Upon truly studying the history and tradition of firearms in
America, there can be no doubt that firearms ownership qualifies as a
fundamental aspect of liberty under the Fifth Amendment. As a fun-
damental right, any attempt by the federal government to abridge the
right must be subject to strict scrutiny. While there are some scholarly
writers who advance the position that most gun control measures could
survive a strict scrutiny analysis, those accepting this position must be
reminded that the Constitution does not give Congress the authority to
regulate for the general welfare. 166 As such, any federal gun control
legislation that is not narrowly tailored, and which seeks to regulate
for the general welfare, will fail under a strict scrutiny analysis.
At the time the founders drafted our Constitution, they found it
necessary to require all able-bodied males to be armed, trained, and
ready should they be called upon to defend the country from an over-
zealous tyrannical government. Today, however, firearms ownership
is a personal choice and an aspect of liberty. Many times, it is a form of
self-protection and self-preservation.
16 7
Because the Fifth Amendment has been incorporated to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment, it is some, if not all, of the
uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of the Second Amendment
that stems from the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment has not de-
fined aspects of liberty with precision. The Court recognized this
unfortunate situation in Meyer v. Nebraska, where, in discussing how
the Fourteenth Amendment does not specify all aspects of liberty, it
wrote:
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of
the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge,...
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
168
(Emphasis added).
166. Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MIL. L. REV. 683 (2007).
167. See Fox News, Armed Miss America 1944 Stops Intruder (2007) available at http:l!
www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,267540,00.html. (Balances on walker and shoots out tires
with snub-nosed .38) (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
168. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
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Too a woman living in today's society, the right to keep and bear
a firearm gives her unparalleled freedom. Women should be liberated
by the fact that they must not live in fear as so many women in today's
society do. For a mother or wife that believes in the Second Amend-
ment, our founders had the brilliant foresight to ensure that a woman
could always be able to protect themselves and their family.
The Second Amendment gives the freedom to be armed in the
event America ever has the misfortune of encountering a tyrannical
government, as with the Soviet domination of the Ukraine. Moreover,
in light of the recent tragedy at Virginia Tech University, institutions
of higher learning across America must reassess their positions on
prohibiting law-abiding students and teachers from carrying concealed
weapons on campuses and exercising their Second Amendment rights.
Many of these students and teachers have prior military training, or
have otherwise demonstrated the proficiency in safety and marksman-
ship which is required to obtain a concealed weapons permit. In the
nine minutes it took a crazed gunman to massacre over thirty people at
Virginia Tech. Imagine the lives that could have been saved had a fel-
low student or professor been armed.
For those who oppose individual gun ownership, consider
whether Hitler could have mustered the power that he did had every
Jewish person been armed. Unquestionably, the notion of an armed
militia comprised of ordinary people, was exactly what the founders
had in mind when they drafted the Second Amendment. Hilter's rise
to power would not have been as easy as it was had the people had the
right to bear arms.
When considering the foregoing, every American citizen must
ask the same question: What is the easiest way for a tyrannical govern-
ment to control and dominate its people? The answer is
unsurprisingly simple, disarm its citizens. When disarmament is ac-
complished, bad intentions are much easier to facilitate.
The importance of educating people on the Second Amendment
becomes evident when an unarmed American citizen must face an
armed foe. The Second Amendment, as a fundamental aspect of lib-
erty, must be vehemently protected if all of our citizens desire to
remain safe and free. Clarence Darrow has been credited with saying,
"history repeats itself." That, chilling as it may be, is reason enough to
guard at all costs the rights of "the people" to keep and bear arms.
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